

EXHIBIT A.630

(1 of 7)



January 1, 2006

Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S)

Suicide bombing terrorism during the current Israeli-Palestinian confrontation

(September 2000 – December 2005)

The suicide bombing attack in Zion Square, its reward and cost...

The suicide bomber:
Nabil Mahmoud Jamil
Halabiya, Hamas suicide
bomber, who carried out
the suicide bombing
attack in Zion Square in
Jerusalem (December 1,
2001).



Payment: A check for
\$15,000 paid to the
suicide bomber's family
by Saddam Hussein's
representatives in the
Palestinian Authority-
administered territories.




**Results of the suicide
bombing attack:** 11 dead
and 170 wounded. In the
photo: the scene a short
time after the attack
(Photo: Reinhard Kraus,
Reuters).



Overview

- Since the end of September 2000, the Palestinian terrorist organizations have been waging a campaign of terrorism against Israel, unprecedented in scope and ferocity. During it they have made extensive use of suicide terrorism, "human bombs" which they view as the "strategic weapons" which will most effectively murder Israeli civilians. As far as the terrorist organizations are concerned, the use of such weapons to strike at population centers -- Israel's soft underbelly -- will cause large numbers of casualties, damage the economy and society, and overcome some of Israel's security measures.
- During the current violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation the Palestinian terrorist organizations have carried out **147 suicide bombing attacks**. They caused the deaths of **525 Israelis**, the overwhelming majority of whom were civilians -- that is, approximately **half of the 1,084** killed so far by terrorist attacks. The **largest number of suicide bombing attacks** were carried out during the **first four months of 2002**. Since then there has been a **slow but noticeable reduction**, principally as a result of IDF actions against terrorist centers in the West Bank after Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002) and of the building many sections of the security fence.
- This study was originally written in Hebrew and then translated into English. The English version was updated on December 31, 2005 and contains a number of changes.

Yearly distribution of suicide bombing



* In 2002, 24 suicide bombing attacks were carried out before Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002) and 36 after it.

• There were fewer suicide bombing attacks in (2005, during the so-called "lull in the fighting") because of the following reasons: Effective Israeli security force measures; the positive influence of the security fence; the decrease in legitimacy among the Palestinians, especially in the Gaza Strip. It was influenced by the opposition of the Palestinian Authority (PA) under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to suicide bombing attacks. However, **such attacks continue** to be carried out and are still supported by parts of the general Palestinian public, and sometimes are even indirectly tolerated by the PA.

During the lull, after the understandings reached at the Sharm el-Sheikh summit meeting in February 2005, **six murderous suicide bombing attacks** were carried out in Tel Aviv, Netanya (two attacks), Beersheba, Hadera and near the IDF roadblock in Tulkarm (as compared to 15 during 2004). Four were carried out by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and one by Hamas. It should be noted that **a number of planned suicide bombing attacks** were foiled by Israeli security forces.

• This study is not comprehensive, relating to all the aspects of Palestinian suicide terrorism. It is an addition to the list of works which have already appeared (See bibliography) and should be considered a tool for studies carried out in the future. It is divided into two parts:

⊕ **Part A: A general description of Palestinian suicide terrorism during the five years of the current violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation (September 2000 to December 2005).** It deals with different aspects of suicide bombing terrorism, such as: the terrorist organizations which carry out the attacks, the roles of Syria and Iran, terrorist targets, the results of the attacks, the suicide bombers' motives and profiles of the suicide bombers and their victims.


⊕ **Part B: A description of the suicide bombing attacks and data on the victims of the past five years.** This section examines the main characteristics of the 146 suicide bombing attacks carried out so far and describes their victims. The information was provided by the Israel Security Agency (ISA) with additions from the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies.¹

¹ Most of the information comes directly from the Website of the office of the Prime Minister of Israel (www.pmo.gov.il). There are data presented by the ISA head, Yuval Diskin, at a session of the Interior and Environment Committee of the Knesset (reported to the media by the Committee on July 19, 2005). Information about the numbers and status of the victims was taken from the Website of Israeli National Insurance (www.laad.btl.gov.il) and from the Foreign Ministry. Additional data and the analytical introduction were provided by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) at the Center for Special Studies (CSS). Several of the illustrations were taken from the Display of Captured Materials and Archives of the ITIC.

Part A: Five years of suicide bombing terrorism

Overview

Between the beginning of the current violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation (the end of September 2005) and December 2005 the Palestinian terrorist organizations carried out **25,770²** terrorist attacks. In those attacks 1,084 Israelis were killed. Of the attacks, **147 were suicide bombing attacks** (as of December 31, 2005) carried out by **156 male and 8 female suicide bombers.³** Some 450 of other suicide bombing attacks were foiled at various stages by the Israeli security forces and as a result of the detentions of potential suicide bombers, their comrades and handlers. It should be noted that this study does not include planned attacks that were not realized.



² Since May 2005 395 more attacks were carried out, so that as of December 31, 2005, the total number of attacks reached 25,770

³ In addition to the 142 suicide bombing attacks listed by the ISA were the one in **Netanya** (July), **Beersheba** (August), **Hadera** (October) **Netanya** (December), and near the IDF roadblock in **Tulkarm** (December)

• The objective of most of the 147 suicide bombing attacks was to indiscriminately kill Israeli civilians. The attacks killed 527 Israelis and wounded approximately 3,350.⁴ The numbers clearly illustrate the murderous nature of suicide bombing attacks as compared with all other types of terrorist attacks: although statistically suicide bombing attacks constituted only half of a percent of all attacks, they were responsible for half of the number of Israelis killed during the period in question.

Who is a suicide bomber? What is suicide activity?

• For the purposes of this document **suicide activity** is defined as an attack or attempted attack during which the terrorist reaches his objective or its vicinity carrying or wearing an explosive device which is he is supposed to detonate **to blow himself up** (i.e., the suicide bomber is **aware that he has no chance of remaining alive**,⁵ assuming the explosive device detonates as planned).⁶

• From the point of view of those who support such attacks, most of whom base their rationale on modern radical Islam, the act is not suicide as the term is generally accepted, i.e., an act of desperation carried out for personal reasons (*intihar*), which is forbidden by Islam. Quite the opposite, it is an act of martyrdom carried out by a Muslim (male or female) for the sake of Allah (*istishhad*). Thus a suicide bomber is referred to as *istishhadi* (and not *shaheed*), that is, one who has knowingly sacrificed himself or herself for the sake of Allah.

• Nevertheless, it should be noted that often there is no clear distinction between *istishhadi* (suicide bomber) and *shaheed* (or *shaheeda*), which is a classic Islamic

⁴ In addition, there were those suffering from shock and those who were not seriously injured and who were not included in the statistics.

⁵ This document does not deal with any attack in which the terrorist has a possibility of remaining alive, even if he greatly endangers his (or her) life.

⁶ Since September 2000 there were instances in which for whatever reason, the explosive did not detonate, and the suicide terrorists were apprehended and incarcerated.

term referring to one who has fallen for the sake of Allah, usually as an act of self-sacrifice on the battlefield in a holy war against the infidel (*jihad*), usually against an infidel enemy of superior military strength. According to the modern Islamist interpretation, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, a *shaheed* is anyone who dies during the confrontation. That includes **anyone who is killed in a planned action against Israel** or was killed by Israel (i.e., in a targeted killing or by sniper fire or in an exchange of fire, etc.) or even more prosaically during a “work accident.”⁷

- The term *istishhadi* is used by the Palestinian terrorist organizations and their sponsors to give a **special distinction to suicide bombers who have of their own free will chosen to become shaheeds** and knowingly gone out on a mission from which **they have no chance of returning alive**. The suicide bombing act is called *‘amaliyyah istishhadiyyah* (an act of self-sacrifice for the sake of Allah) and the “battlefields” are areas populated by Israelis: crowded streets, shopping malls, buses, restaurants, etc. It is a modern term which is not found in classic or medieval Islamic literature, but which is very popular today in Palestinian society and the Arab world. The *istishhadi*, the suicide bomber, enjoys great popularity and is surrounded by an aura of respect stemming from his risk-taking, his bravery, and the absolute knowledge that blew himself up and died in the attack. Thus ***istishhadi* is necessarily *shaheed*, but not every *shaheed* is necessarily *istishhadi***. Nevertheless, the distinction is not always clearly made.

- Such a perception, which according to supporters of suicide bombing attacks provides **Islamic religious legitimization**, was expressed in an MA thesis presented at Al-Najah University in Nablus in December 2001, one year into the current violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation. It dealt with the issue of acts of *istishhad* in Palestinian society⁸ and, relying on both traditional Islamic sources and statements

⁷ Preparing or carrying an explosive device which detonates prematurely.

⁸ The MA candidate was a Palestinian student names **Yasser Mahmoud ‘Ali Abu Bakar**, a Fatah activist who studied at Al-Najah. His thesis was entitled “The growth of the idea of *istishhad* in Palestinian society.” For further information see our Special Bulletin, “The suicide bombers and martyr culture at Al-Najah University in Nablus,” at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/11_04/najah.htm.

made by modern Islamic religious leaders (among them Dr. Yussuf al-Qardawi), defined *istishhadi* as “an individual who decided to carry out the act of *istishhad* orally and physically [i.e., with premeditation].” Such an individual, according to the thesis, **was not committing an act of suicide motivated by personal distress (*intihar*), which is forbidden by Islam**, but quite the opposite. An *istishhadi*, he wrote, **sacrifices his life** for [various] causes, the most important of which is to **satisfy Allah and attain paradise**. The person who commits suicide [because of personal distress] kills himself out of frustration and desperation, and for no reason. The *istishhadi*, according to the conclusion of the MA thesis, is “one who leaves his home, his studies, his work and his entire life and **strides [knowingly] to his death** [for the sake of Allah].”

Advantages gained by the suicide bomber and his family

● According to classic Muslim literature, many advantages and benefits are promised to the *shaheed*, for example: he extricates himself from the Torments of the Tomb, he is exempt from the terrors of Judgment Day, he is forgiven for all the sins he committed during his lifetime, he is entitled to recommend that his relatives – up to 70 of them – enter paradise (an important and exceptional privilege in Muslim society) where the men will marry 72 black-eyed virgins (*hurriyyat*) and the women, each a single *shaheed*,⁹ and he will live in the highest heaven with Allah, who will take care of all his needs, in the presence of the prophet Muhammad and righteous men.¹⁰

⁹ For that reason the posters and obituaries of many suicide bombers call the act a “marriage” and the suicide bomber a “bridegroom,” and describe him as a bridegroom accompanied to his wedding with songs and dances.

¹⁰ The main *hadith* (oral tradition) referring to the benefits accrued to the *shaheed* is the following:

قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: (لِلشَّهِيدِ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ سِتُّ خِصَالٍ: يُغْفَرُ لَهُ فِي أَوَّلِ دَفْعَةٍ وَيُرَى مَقْعَدَهُ مِنَ الْجَنَّةِ وَيَجَارُ مِنْ عَذَابِ الْقَبْرِ، وَيَأْمَنُ مِنَ الْفَزَعِ الْأَكْبَرِ، وَيُوضَعُ عَلَى رَأْسِهِ تَاجُ الْوَقَارِ الْيَاقُوتَةُ مِنْهُ خَيْرٌ مِنَ الدُّنْيَا وَمَا فِيهَا، وَيُزَوَّجُ اثْنَتَيْنِ وَسَبْعِينَ مِنَ الْحُورِ الْعِينِ، وَيُشْفَعُ فِي سَبْعِينَ مِنْ أَقْرَبَائِهِ).

The benefits the *shaheed* receives in the next world, most of them credited to the prophet Muhammad.

- The bundle of benefits presented to the *shaheed* after his death is **also promised to the suicide bomber**, the *istishhadi*. Verifying the issue with an expert on Muslim law, we learned that as opposed to the popular myth, **the suicide bomber does not receive an exclusive “bundle” after this death that differentiates him from the *shaheed***. For example, 72 black-eyed virgins are granted to both the *shaheed* who was randomly killed during the confrontation in an exchange of gunfire with IDF soldiers and the same is granted to the suicide bomber who chose to blow himself up in a crowd of Israeli civilians.

- Although according to Islamic law there is no difference between the *shaheed* and the suicide bomber, Saddam Hussein’s representatives, who gave large sums of money to the families of *shaheeds* during the confrontation, were careful to create an **artificial distinction** (which has no authorization in Muslim religious law) between the two as a **means of increasing motivation to carry out suicide bombing attacks**.

- A document was found among correspondence between activists for the Arab Liberation Front (Saddam Hussein’s representatives in the PA-administered territories) which dealt with the question of who a suicide bomber was (See below).¹¹ Their interest in the subject was not theoretical, because the distinction made between a “regular” *shaheed* and one killed in a suicide bombing attack had **practical importance**. Depending on the category, the Iraqi régime sent (sometimes through the “charitable societies” which support the families of *shaheeds*) **larger sums**

For further information see the following Internet sites:


- 1) http://islamonline.net/Arabic/Eid_AlAdha/1425/Sacrifice/Articles/04.shtml for the article by Dr. Rajab Abu Malih Muhammad of Cairo University, who is responsible for the religious verses appearing on the site;
- 2) <http://alsaha.fares.net/sahat?128@2.pfF7ha8AP6P.0@.1dd4d09f>;
- 3) <http://www.kalemat.org/sections.php?so=va&aid=239>;
- 4) <http://www.imanway.com/vb/printthread.php?t=2888>.

¹¹ For further information see our Special Bulletin “Iraqi Support for and Encouragement of Palestinian Terrorism,” at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/bu/iraq/iraq_fa.htm.

(initially **\$15,000** and later **\$25,000**) to the families of suicide bombers (with a special certificate) than to those of “ordinary” *shaheeds* (**\$10,000**).

• A concrete example of the interest in the issue of who a suicide bomber is could be found at the beginning of May 2002, when the Arab Liberation Front’s representative in Jenin claimed that the two terrorists **who had carried out a shooting attack in Afula on November 27, 2001 (two Israeli civilians killed and 48 wounded) were not considered suicide bombers**. In fact, it was stated, they fired machine guns (which gave them a chance of escaping) **and did not use explosives to knowingly sacrifice themselves for the sake of Allah** (which would not give them a chance of remaining alive). **Rakad Salem** (Abu Mahmoud), secretary of the Arab Liberation Front and of the Ba’ath party in the PA-administered territories (in charge of distributing funds for Saddam Hussein), was asked to decide the issue

A captured document dealing with the distinction between ordinary *shaheeds* and suicide bombers



To the dear comrade Abu Mahmoud [secretary of the Arab Liberation Front and the Ba'ath party in the PA-administered territories]

Greetings and salutations

Enclosed please find the letter I received from Jenin. Please read and make the decision.

With respect and estimation

Abu Layla

To the respected comrade, may peace be upon you,

As part of the grants Iraq gives to the families of martyrs, it was decided to pay the sum of 25 thousand dollars to those families [i.e., the families of suicide bombers]. In practice the distribution of the grant is carried out by those entrusted to do so in the Jenin district, but a problem has arisen concerning the family of martyr 'Abd al-Karim Abu Na'asah. The family has a connection to the [Arab Liberation] Front.

On November 27, 2001, 'Abd al-Karim Abu Na'asah and Mustafa Abu al-Sariah used machine guns to carry out a suicide attack in the central bus station in Afula. Both were killed in the action, and all the details indicate that it was clearly a suicide action. [However,] the representative of the Arab Liberation Front in Jenin claims that it cannot be considered a suicide action because **they did not use explosive belts**.

On the other hand, the families of the martyrs have rejected the claim and are determined that it was a suicide action ('*amaliyyah istishhadiyyah*'), with regard to both categorizing it as a suicide action and the financial rights [they are entitled to according to that category].

We ask that you raise the issue before the Arab [Liberation Front] brothers where you are, especially since their representatives here with us asked that they be presented with the issue at a broad forum to [receive] a decision [about the matter in question]. Please deal with this, and inform us of the [decision] reached [about the matter].

Blessings,

Jenin, May 9 [possibly August 9], 2002




Suicide bombing attacks according to the terrorist organizations which carried them out


• **Hamas** has carried out the largest number of suicide bombing attacks of all the Palestinian terrorist organizations: 58 attacks, or about 40% of the total. The **PIJ** has carried out 39, or about 27% of the total. The various **Fatah** factions have carried out 33, or about 23% of the total. The **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine** (PFLP) has carried out 8 attacks. Eight attacks were joint operations between two or more terrorist organizations, including between Islamic and secular organizations. **Only one suicide bomber attempted to carry out a suicide bombing attack on his own initiative.**

However, during the past year (under Abu Mazen and during the lull) there has been a **marked increase in the activity of the PIJ, which as become the organization most active in carrying out suicide bombing attacks.** During 2005 it was responsible for **five deadly suicide bombing attacks** as opposed to two by Hamas (one in January, before the lull).

Yearly statistics for suicide bombing attacks



Suicide bombing activity according to organization



• An analysis of the graph shows that 67% of the suicide bombing attacks were carried out by **Hamas and the PIJ**, that is, the two Islamist Palestinian terrorist organizations in competition with the PA and sponsored by Iran and Syria.

Particularly conspicuous is the **PIJ**, which despite its relatively small size carried out a large number of murderous suicide bombing attacks in Israeli cities, most of them through its terrorist-operative infrastructure in Samaria. It is also the organization which carried out the largest number of suicide bombing attacks during the lull.

- An examination of suicide bombing attacks in **Jerusalem** shows a slightly different distribution from the rest of the country. In Jerusalem the various **Fatah** factions (Tanzim and Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades) and **Hamas** carried out the largest number of suicide bombing attacks. Each of the two organizations carried out 13 suicide bombing attacks (33.8%). The **PIJ** was responsible for three suicide bombing attacks and one was the result of personal initiative.¹²

Syria and Iran sponsor suicide bombing terrorism

- **Syria** and **Iran** are the most important patrons of the terrorist organizations carrying out suicide bombing attacks. They support them in a variety of ways: **Syria** allows **Hamas** and the **PIJ** to act from its territory. The headquarters of these two organizations are established in Damascus and they use Syria as a base from which to orchestrate their terrorist activities, including suicide bombing attacks, and transmit know-how and weapons to the PA-administered territories. **Syria and Lebanon** also allow the organizations' terrorist-operatives to train in their territory. **Iran** allocates funds to encourage terrorism which it then either transmits to the terrorist organizations directly, or through the **Iranian Revolutionary Guards**¹³ or through **Hezbollah**.

¹² For further information see our Special Bulletin "Jerusalem as a preferred target for Palestinian terrorism during the five years of violent confrontation," at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/ct_iss_be.htm.

¹³ For example, the double suicide bombing attack carried out near the central bus station in Tel Aviv on January 5, 2003, was carried out by a Fatah cell from Nablus and funded by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

● **Syria and Iran** have provided military aid and political support for **Hezbollah**, which has played a central role in encouraging Palestinian terrorism (including suicide bombing terrorism), throughout the current violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation. Since Israel withdrew from Lebanon (May 2000), and more so since 2003, Hezbollah has handled Palestinian terrorist infrastructures in the PA-administered territories, especially Fatah/Tanzim/Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. Hezbollah orchestration and support include **instructions for carrying out attacks of mass destruction inside Israel**, mediation between operatives in various centers, transmission of large sums of money and the upgrade of the terrorist infrastructures' weapons and terrorism capabilities.



Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah as a source of inspiration for Fatah/Tanzim operatives in Ramallah. Supporting the Fatah infrastructure and exploiting the money it transfers to them as leverage, Hezbollah goads them into carrying out mass-killing suicide bombing attacks.

● Among the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the **PIJ's** dependence on Syria and Iran is especially evident. **Syria** allows the organization's leadership, headed by Dr. Ramadan Shalah, to operate from its territory and from its headquarters in Damascus to orchestrate terrorist activities in the PA-administered territories. **Iran**, the organization's principal patron, provides generous financial support and in fact **funds most of its budget**. Through their massive support of the organization, Syria and Iran have fostered the organization's dependence on them and have thus **acquired the capability to escalate** (or, should they so choose, to deflate) the terrorism in the PA-administered territories without being directly involved (it should be recalled in this context that the PIJ is the organization which, directed by Syria, has carried out most of the suicide bombing attacks during the lull.)

Orchestrating terrorism from Damascus

Hamas



Khaled Mashal,
head of Hamas's political bureau

Palestinian Islamic Jihad



Ramadan Shalah,
PIJ leader

**A document captured during Operation Defensive Shield
(April 2002): a Palestinian intelligence report dated
October 31, 2001, regarding Iran's intentions to use
Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations to
escalate the – original document and translation**



Translation

The Palestinian National Authority
Preventive Security Headquarters
General Staff

Date: October 31, 2001

Reference: 2001.10.1200

To: Brother President, Abu 'Amar [Yasser Arafat], may Allah preserve him

Blessings of the homeland

In re: The opposition parties are working energetically to increase joint action

According to information in our hands, **intensive meetings are being held in Damascus** attended by the leaders of Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front [for the Liberation of Palestine] and Hezbollah **to increase joint action "inside"** [i.e., the PA-administered territories] **with financial aid from Iran. That was after a message was sent from Iran to the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad leadership stating that no calm was to be permitted [in the situation] during the present time. Hezbollah will increase its financial aid to escalate [violence] in the near future. What is now required [from the opposition parties] is to carry out suicide bombing attacks against Israeli targets in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and inside Israel.**

Blessings of the revolution

Your brother

Jibril Rajoub

[Comments hand-written by Arafat:]

[At the head of the page:] Personal

Copies to: al-Majiada, al-Haj Ismail, Amin, al-Dahlan

Suicide bombing targets: civilians in the crosshairs¹⁴

• Most of the suicide bombing attacks were directed by the terrorist organizations against civilian targets, especially within the green line,¹⁵ to cause as much indiscriminate wholesale murder of civilians as possible. Of the 147 suicide bombing attacks carried out since September 2000, 107 (73%) targeted civilians. Only 40 attacks (27%) targeted the military or security forces.

• The most common military-security targets were IDF posts, patrols and roadblocks manned by soldiers, the police and the Border Guard. **Most of the suicide bombing attacks against those targets were crowned with failure.** Only eight of the 40 attacks caused the deaths of security personnel: 12 dead,¹⁶ or **2.29% of the 525 killed in suicide bombing attacks.**

• Although the suicide bombing attacks against military/security targets led to relatively few deaths, **the opposite is true of attacks targeting civilians.** Such attacks led to the **indiscriminate slaughter of Israeli civilians**, men, women, the aged, children and infants. Of the 107 suicide bombing attacks targeting civilians, **69 (64%) had a lethal outcome.** In those attacks **512 individuals were killed.**

• The civilian targets most often and most forcefully hit, and those with the greatest number of casualties, were:

• **Local and inter-urban buses and bus stops:** among the hardest hit were three local buses in Jerusalem (23, 19 and 17 civilians killed), an inter-urban bus

¹⁴ The Palestinian terrorist organizations which carry out the suicide bombing attacks claim that targeting civilians is legitimate because all Israeli citizens have served or will serve in the Israeli army, thus there is no difference between civilian and soldier.

¹⁵ The pre-1967 Israeli border.

¹⁶ To the number of security personnel who were killed in suicide bombing attacks should be added those who happened to be in the vicinity of attacks on civilian targets, such as buses, restaurants, crowded streets, etc. where they were not the primary targets.

at the Megiddo crossroads (17 killed) and two local buses in Haifa (15 civilians killed in each explosion).

❖ **Places of entertainment, such as restaurants, cafés, clubs and shopping malls:** among the most devastating were the attack at the Park Hotel in Netanya on the eve of the Passover Seder in 2002 (29 killed, the worst attack during the current violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation¹⁷), the attack at the Dolphinarium club in Tel Aviv (22 killed, the overwhelming majority of whom were teenagers), the attack at the Maxim restaurant in Haifa (21 killed), the attack at the billiard club in Rishon Letzion (16 killed), the attack at the Matza restaurant in Haifa (15 killed) and the attack at the Sbarro restaurant in Jerusalem (15 killed).

❖ **Places where people congregate, especially in Israel's big cities:** markets, malls, main streets. Two of the worst suicide bombing attacks were at the old central bus station in Tel Aviv (23 killed) and at the Ben Yehuda pedestrian mall in Jerusalem (11 killed).

¹⁷ The attack served as the catalyst for Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002).

Suicide bombing attacks inside Israel vs. attacks against Jewish settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip

- **The main targets for suicide bombing attacks were Israeli cities within the green line:** 100 suicide bombing attacks, 68% of all terrorist attacks (and the most lethal of them). Forty-seven attacks, about 32%, were carried out in the Gaza Strip (26) and the Judea and Samaria (21).

- The distribution of suicide bombing attacks according to area is as follows:

- ✦ **Greater Jerusalem**, the suicide bombing attack focus, 30 attacks.

- ✦ **The Sharon area** (Netanya, Hadera, Kfar Saba), 19 attacks. This district has become the focus for attacks during the lull (three out of five carried out here).

- ✦ **Greater Tel Aviv**, 17 attacks.

- ✦ The area around **Wadi Ara** (which connects the coast north of Hadera with the interior), 10 attacks.

- ✦ **Afula, Beit Shean and the Jordan Valley**, 10 attacks.


- ✦ The **Haifa** area, 9 attacks.

- ✦ The **Galilee (1)** and the **south (4)** attacks (two regions conspicuous for their lack of suicide bombing attacks).

- The above data show that suicide bombing terrorism (and terrorism in general) **focused on Jerusalem** more than any other Israeli city. That is, in our assessment, due to its status as the capital city of the State of Israel and a well-known symbolic city for the whole world, and also because it is a mixed city, with Jewish and Arab populations living in close proximity. Jerusalem also lies close to many Palestinian

cities and villages (such as Bethlehem and Ramallah), whose residents enjoy good accessibility to the city, which makes it easy for the terrorist organizations to infiltrate suicide bombers.¹⁸ However, as noted, the Sharon area, to which the PIJ has channeled most of its efforts, has become the focus of suicide bombing attacks during the lull.

Distribution of suicide bombing attacks according to area





¹⁸ For further information on terrorist attacks in Jerusalem (particularly suicide bombing attacks), see our Special Bulletin "Jerusalem as a preferred target for Palestinian terrorism during the five years of violent confrontation," at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/ct_iss_be.htm.

Profile of suicide bombing attack victims


• Lacking a reliable, comprehensive database suicide bombing attack victims (a subject worthy of study in its own right) we cannot provide definitive profiles of those who were killed in the attacks. Nevertheless, certain traits can be gleaned from the partial data we have, which is mostly based on the information found on the Internet site of Israel's National Insurance Institution (See below). Following is some of the information about those killed:

• **Civilians vs. the military:** The majority of the victims were Israeli **civilians** (425 of the total 525), with 27 foreign nationals (most of them foreign workers). **Seventy three** belonged to the security forces, most of them who **happened to be in the area** of the attack at the time. Only **12** members of the security forces were killed in attacks deliberately carried out against military-security targets and the rest (61) were killed during suicide bombing attacks **targeting sites which were clearly civilian**.






⊕ **Men vs. women:** Of the total number of victims, 297 (56.5%) were men and 228 (43.7%) were women. The difference is small and in our assessment has no statistical significance.



⊕ **A large number of infants, children, teenagers and the elderly:** Among the victims were a **large number of those belonging to the weaker sectors of the population**. Twenty-eight percent of the victims were younger than three years old, children under the age of 13, teenagers aged 14-18 and individuals older than 66. Fifty percent were between 19 and 45 and 22% between 46 and 65.



⚙ We have no data about the national and ethnic background of the victims, their education or socio-economic status.

Profile of the suicide bombers- a general description

⚙ No exact profile can be drawn of a typical suicide bomber operating during the current violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation because their nature has changed during the five years of attacks. The following are the main features of the suicide bombers and illustrate the changes that have occurred in the overall profile.

⚙ **Age:** The overwhelming majority, about 75%, of the suicide bombers are between the ages of 17 and 24. However, during 2004 the average aged decreased and there was an increase in the number of underage suicide bombers (younger than 17).¹⁹ At the same time, suicide bombers over the age of 35 have almost disappeared, although there were few to begin with.

¹⁹ Suicide bombers who because they were younger were also less well-educated and therefore easier to manipulate and their operational level was lower.

◆ **Family status:** Most of the suicide bombers were single, one reason for which is their young age.²⁰ Nevertheless, a small number were married, from which it can be understood that marriage did not prevent them from becoming suicide bombers.

◆ **Origin:** During the first three years of the confrontation (2000-2003) most of the suicide bombers (64%) resided in **Samaria** (the **Nablus-Jenin** district). That was because the terrorist-operative infrastructures of the Palestinian terrorist organizations in Samaria were the **most prominent** in planning and carrying out suicide bombing attacks (**not by chance was Jenin called “the suicide bomber capital”**). Seventeen percent came from **Judea**. During 2004 the number of suicide bombers from the **Gaza Strip** increased (44% as opposed to 16% in previous years); they targeted civilian and military installations in the Gaza Strip itself or the crossing points from the Gaza Strip into Israel. **At the same time there was a substantial decrease in the number of suicide bombers from the West Bank.**²¹ In 2005, during the lull, **the number of suicide bombers from Samaria increased because of the leading role played by the PIJ infrastructures there (particularly in Jenin and Tulkarm) in planning suicide bombing attacks in Israel.**

◆ **Education:** Most of the suicide bombers were **educated**. From 2000-2003 22% of the suicide bombers were graduates of PA-administered territories universities, whose campuses serve as recruiting centers;²² 34% were high

²⁰ In their video-taped wills the suicide bombers claimed they avoided marriage in this world because they preferred to reach paradise and have 72 black-eyed virgins.

²¹ That was caused by the damage done to the terrorist infrastructure in Samaria as a result of Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002) and the difficulties faced by the suicide bombers caused by the completion of the buffer zone and the security fence. The PIJ's infrastructures in Samaria overcame the obstacles and renewed their activities in 2005.

²² During the current violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation the universities in the PA-administered territories have been conspicuous as centers for disseminating hate propaganda, inciting to violence and terrorism and glorifying suicide bombers. The student organizations of the various Palestinian terrorist organizations have been active in recruiting students to the terrorist organizations and to terrorist activities including suicide bombing attacks. Even after

school graduates and only 9% had only a basic education. The education of the rest is unknown, although it is reasonable to assume they had elementary and high school education but were not university graduates. **During 2004 there was a decrease in the number of suicide bombers who were university-(8%) and high school-educated (8%)**

The universities in the PA-administered territories are recruiting centers for suicide bombers




The front cover of a hate-propaganda kit distributed by Jumaa al-Islamiyyah, the PIJ student organization at Al-Najah University. On the lower right is a veiled suicide bomber wearing an explosive belt and a headband bearing the inscription "The Jerusalem Battalions" (the PIJ's terrorist-operative wing). Above him is the Al-Najah University campus. To his left is a dedicatory inscription for the kit which says, among other things, "To those who understand, understand well that right is taken by main force and not given as a gift"

the death of Arafat the situation has remained substantially the same. For further information see our Special Bulletin "In the era of Abu Mazen, universities in the Palestinian Authority administered territories continue to serve as centers of incitement," at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/4_05/univ.htm.


Statistical data²³

Distribution by age




²³ The data are from the Israel Security Agency and are updated to May 2005. In addition there were five more suicide bombing attacks: one in Netanya in July 2005 and another in December, one in Beersheba in August and one in Hadera in October and near the IDF roadblock in Tulkarm.


Distribution according to family status



Distribution according to place of residence



Distribution according to level of education



Suicide bomber motivation

• During the current confrontation, suicide bombing terrorism, which began in the 1990s, has become **the Palestinian terrorist organizations' main "strategic weapon."** There are many reasons that is so, including its lethal ability to wreak terrible devastation, its great public and media impact (in Israel, in the PA-administered territories, in the Arab-Muslim world and abroad),²⁴ its ability to disrupt (sometimes even significantly) daily life in Israel and the relative ease with which it can be funded and carried out.²⁵ In addition, the terrorist organizations, which consider themselves the weaker side of the confrontation, **represent the use of suicide bombing terrorism as the best response to Israel's military superiority.**

• The reason the lone suicide bomber is willing to sacrifice his life in the service of the terrorist organizations originates in a variety of motives: **religious Islamic motives** such as *istishhad* (the death of a martyr for the sake of Allah) and the promised rewards in paradise;²⁶ **nationalist motives** such as the "liberation" of "Palestine" from the Israeli occupier;²⁷ **personal, organizational and social motives** such as revenge on the Israeli enemy for the deaths of Palestinians, the desire to rid oneself of suspicion of collaboration with Israel or of other suspicions and the need of female suicide bombers to atone for what is perceived in Palestinian society as

²⁴ After every suicide bombing attack, the popular Arab TV station **Al-Jazeera** and other Arab channels customarily interview the heads of the terrorist organizations and provide them and their terrorist actions with a pan-Arabic media forum to disseminate their propaganda. Hezbollah's TV station **Al-Manar** openly encourages suicide bombing attacks. The Arab (and foreign) media customarily issue the suicide bombers' videotaped wills and biographies, helping to give them mythic proportions and turn them into role models.

²⁵ During the early years of the confrontation there was no lack of volunteers for suicide bombing attacks, with the result that suicide bombers were available and easily located by all the Palestinian terrorist organizations. There is also no lack of money to fund suicide bombing attacks.

²⁶ Many suicide bombers were fanatical Muslims or born-again Muslims who became fanatical. Some of them were indoctrinated by the mosques and extremist clerics (Palestinian and others) who not only legitimized suicide bombing attacks, but encouraged them. Insofar as we have been able to discover, not a single suicide bombing attack was carried out by a Christian Palestinian.

²⁷ The secular terrorist organizations, such as Fatah, have also used religious Islamic terminology on their posters and in the obituaries of suicide bombers. That reflects, in our assessment, the Islamization of the current violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation.

“sully the family honor.” Sometimes more than one motive is at play when a potential suicide bomber takes it upon himself (or herself) to carry out an attack.



A poster of Hamas *shaheeds* killed during December 2003 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The upper inscription is one of the Qur'an verses often used by the supporters of suicide bombing attacks to justify them. Under the Hamas insignia the inscription reads "The Palestinian resistance movement [Hamas] sacrifices for the sake of Allah, may he be praised and exalted, a select group of the best members of the Brigades of the shaheed Izzedine al-Qassam, in the expectation that they will receive their reward from Allah in the next world. Their pure souls rose heavenward at the hour they fought against the occupying enemy [and thereby sacrificed their lives]. Thus this is a jihad which leads to victory or death as a martyr for the sake of Allah [*istishhad*]."

The suicide bombing ethos: turning the suicide bombers into myths and role models

• Until the outbreak of the current confrontation, suicide bombing attacks were a controversial topic²⁸ used mostly by the Islamic terrorist organizations. However, during the current confrontation they moved towards the main stream of Palestinian consensus. The suicide bombing ethos was glorified by the cult of the *shaheeds* (both male and female), especially those who died in mass murder suicide bombing attacks.

²⁸ The main reason for the controversy was the religious Islamic ban on *intihar*, suicide for personal reasons. Until the current confrontation, such attacks were carried out primarily by the Palestinians (Hamas, the PIJ) or local and international terrorist organizations (Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, Chechens). They were also carried out by secular terrorist organizations (the Kurdish PKK in Turkey, the Tamils in Sri Lanka). The suicide bombing attacks of Iranian-backed Hezbollah, inspired by Shiite martyrology from the dawn of Islam, greatly influenced the Palestinian terrorist organizations, which they viewed as having allowed Hezbollah to use terrorist and guerrilla actions instead of political terrorism to make Israel withdraw from Lebanon.

- **The cult of the *shaheeds*, which has become widespread in Palestinian society, culture and media**, is expressed and perpetuated in many ways: streets and institutions are named after them; posters dedicated to their memory are hung and distributed in schools and universities; indoctrination is rife in summer camps and sports events; special days are set aside for their memory, including a “Shaheed Week”; songs, books, concerts and plays glorify their actions; they figure prominently in all forms of Palestinian media, written, spoken and electronic.

- **The cult of the *shaheeds* glorifies and perpetuates the actions of the suicide bombers (*istishhadiyyin*) and turns them into admired figures and role models in Palestinian society. The cult has also raised the social status of the suicide bombers and their families. All of the above have increased the motivation of potential suicide bombers.**²⁹

- During the current confrontation the cult of the *shaheeds* has also spread to the Arab-Muslim world, including to Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Lebanon. Books, songs, TV and regular movies, newspaper articles, TV commentaries and religious edicts (*fatwas*) all praise the suicide bombers’ actions and encourage the Palestinians to continue suicide bombing attacks against Israel. **(When, however, suicide bombing attacks are carried out against their own régimes (i.e., the condemnation of the suicide bombing attacks at the hotels in Jordan, November 2005, they are roundly condemned as terrorist activities.)** The international furor caused by the suicide bombing attacks of Al-Qaeda and those affiliated with it also influenced the Palestinian terrorist organizations,³⁰ although their suicide bombing attacks anteceded Al-Qaeda’s.

²⁹ After the death of Arafat and now, under Abu Mazen, **the public legitimacy of carrying out suicide bombing attacks in Israeli territory has decreased.** The reasons for that are: Palestinian society is tired and hopes for an improvement in daily life, and Abu Mazen has publicly challenged the usefulness of suicide bombing attacks and decreased in the official PA media the extent of incitement to carrying out terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, Fatah, Hamas and the PIJ have continued their efforts to carry them out. Most were foiled by the Israeli security forces, with the exception of five which were carried out during the lull.

³⁰ Among the documents captured by the IDF during its action in the PA-administered territories were posters, pictures and other documents expressing identification with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad.



The suicide bomber as a role model: Young men, apparently students, in front of a poster of Mahmoud Ahmad Marmash, the Hamas suicide bomber who carried out the attack at the **Sharon shopping mall in Netanya on May 18, 2001**, killing five and wounding more than 100. Behind them are other posters commemorating Hamas *shaheeds* and slogans calling for more attacks. The photo was apparently taken at an educational institution and was one of documents found during Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002) (Photo from the collection of captured Palestinian materials at the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center)


Indoctrinating the younger generation with istishhad



A page from the geography notebook of a 10th grade student in Rafah, with a picture of a hand grenade and thoughts about death: "How [can] we die in spite of ourselves?...[Certainly] we are capable of dying as martyrs for the sake of Allah [i.e., in a suicide bombing attack, *istishhad*];" "The unity of those who die as martyrs for the sake of Allah..." (in a suicide bombing attack, *al-istishhadin*). (Photo from Special Information Bulletin "Albums and school notebooks imbued with messages of admiration for Palestinian martyrs," which can be found at

http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/si_86_4/index.htm)

Fostering the suicide bomber myth at the Arab Information Center in Egypt³¹



A book called *The Suicide Bombs: the Balance of Deterrence and the First Signs of Victory*. It is one of a series called Jerusalem Books and was written by Dr. Wajdi 'Abd al-Fatah Sawahil, a specialist in genetic engineering, and issued by the Arab Information Center in 2003. It calls for a continuation of the suicide bombing attacks which he sees as a trump card, the only one left to Palestinian in the violent confrontation with Israel.



A postcard with pictures of Hamas *shaheeds*, some of them well-known terrorist-operatives whose reputations have reached mythic proportions. It shows those, among others, those who died in suicide bombing attacks, some of the particularly deadly: 'Abd al-Basit Odeh, who carried out the suicide bombing attack at the Park Hotel in Netanya on the eve of the Passover Seder in 2002; Shadi al-Tubasi, who blew himself up at the Matza restaurant in Haifa; and Dhiya' Muhammad, who blew himself up at a bus station in the French Hill in Jerusalem.

³¹ A great deal of hate propaganda reaches the PA-administered territories and Israeli Arabs from Egypt. The Arab Information Center is an independent publishing house operating in Egypt and run by Palestinian Islamists with the involvement of members of the Egyptian opposition. It openly conducts an anti-Israeli propaganda campaign. It issues publications of an anti-Semitic nature preaching hatred of Israel and encouraging terrorism. Such publications are directed against the State of Israel, the Jewish people and the Zionist movement. The Center exports them to the Arab-Muslim world and Muslim communities in the West, and they also reach the **PA-administered territories and Israeli Arabs**.

The role of financial incentives in suicide bombing attacks

• **The financial rewards** given to the families of suicide bombers has played a considerable role in increasing suicide bomber motivation and can be added to the factors listed above. During the confrontation, immense sums of money have been transferred to the **terrorist organizations** in the PA-administered territories and to their **civilian infrastructures (da'wah)** through a variety of channels: **the terrorist headquarters "outside"** (chiefly those operating in Syria) are conduits for money from **Iran** and other sources; funds are transferred from **Hezbollah** in Lebanon directly to the terrorist infrastructures in the PA-administered territories; **Arab financial support** for the so-called intifada comes primarily from **Saudi Arabia** and the **Gulf States**; **large amounts** of the contributions from **funds, foundations and charitable societies abroad** are channeled into the Hamas civilian infrastructure.

• Some of the funds have also found their way into the bank accounts of terrorist-operatives, mostly suicide bomber handlers and dispatchers, and of the families of suicide bombers after their deaths. Suicide bombers who agreed to sacrifice their lives knew that the terrorist organization that sent them out would take care of their families financially. Their families did in fact receive **significant financial support**, generally **sums much higher than those received by the families of "ordinary" shaheeds**,³² to say nothing of the prestige of being related to a suicide bomber. The money served as an incentive for others to join the ranks of the suicide bombers.³³

³² For example, Saddam Hussein's régime customarily transferred higher sums of money to the families of suicide bombers than to those of "ordinary" shaheeds. To encourage suicide bombing attacks, it provided **\$25,000 to families of suicide bombers and \$10,000 to the families of "ordinary" shaheeds**.

³³ For further information see our Special Bulletin "Spotlight on Al-Tadhamun Charitable Society," at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/3_05/charity_2g.htm.

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The wages of murder – increased payment to the families of suicide bombers as an incentive to carry out suicide bombing attacks: A check for \$25,000 presented by representatives of Saddam Hussein in the PA-administered territories to the family of Fuad Ismail Ahmad al-Hourani, a Hamas suicide bomber who blew himself up in the Moment Café in Jerusalem on March 9, 2002.

The participation of women in suicide bombing attacks

- Despite the traditional structure of Palestinian Arab society, and despite the standards of morality imposed on its women, during the current confrontation many women have participated in acts of terrorism, including suicide bombing attacks. According to the data provided by the ISA, since January 2002 women have been involved in 83 acts of terrorism, 67 of them involved in suicide bombing attacks. However, as compared to the men, **women** have played an **extremely small part** in the overall number of suicide bombing attacks.

● Of all the suicide bombers, 155 were men and boys and only **eight were women**. However, most of their attacks were deadly and resulted in the 38 deaths and the wounding of 390 (only one attack did not result in deaths). Dozens more women expressed their willingness to carry out suicide bombing attacks but their attempts were foiled by the Israeli security forces. **Fatah** has had the greatest number of women suicide bombers (five of the eight), two others belonged to the **PIJ** and only one to **Hamas**, which has the greatest number of male suicide bombers.

• The main reason for the relatively small number of women suicide bombers is, in our assessment, rooted in **Hamas's religious Islamic restraints (stronger than those of the PIJ) regarding the use of female suicide bombers**. The women's willingness to carry out suicide bombing attacks stems, to a great extent, from personal problems and not specifically religious Islamic or Palestinian nationalist motivation. An analysis of the female suicide bombers profile shows that most of them were on the fringes of Palestinian society because somehow they had disobeyed one of the unwritten laws governing the behavior of women in conservative Palestinian society.³⁴

The exploitation of the weaker sectors of Palestinian society


• Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002), which led to the destruction of terrorist infrastructures in the West Bank and to closer control of the area by Israeli security forces, **and the completion of sections of the security fence and the buffer zone have made it increasingly difficult** for suicide bombers to enter Israel from the West Bank.

• For that reason the Palestinian terrorist organizations have stepped up their exploitation of the weaker sectors of society which, they feel, receive less attention from the Israeli security forces. Those include **minors, women, the ill or men and women whose social image is negative**. The Palestinian terrorist organizations try to exploit their innocent appearances and their personal difficulties to fool the Israeli security forces during examinations at crossing points.

³⁴ For further information see our Special Bulletin "The involvement of women in suicide bombing attacks," at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/6_04/women.htm.

Part B: A description of the suicide bombing attacks and data on the victims of the past five years

The worst of the suicide bombing attacks: the attack at the Passover Seder at the Park Hotel in Netanya



Overview

- This section examines the **147 suicide bombing attacks** carried out between September 2000 and December 31, 2005. Each one was analyzed according to the following categories: general description, detailed description of the event, basic information about the victims and additional information where relevant (pictures of the suicide bombers, posters, captured documents, etc.)

- In assembling the basic information about the **victims** we used two main databases: the number of those killed as they appear in an ISA document and details and photos appearing on the National Health Insurance Internet site (www.laad.bti.gov.il). In some instances we also used information appearing on the Foreign Ministry Internet site (www.mfa.gov.il) or that received from One Family, an association of those whose lives were touched by terrorism.³⁵

- It should be noted that in some instances the numbers of those killed as they appear in the ISA document (on which we based this study) are different from those of the National Insurance Institution or the Foreign Ministry. In our assessment the differences were caused because critically wounded victims later died. In addition, those killed who for a variety of reasons were not entitled to National Insurance benefits (soldiers, foreign workers, tourists) were not listed by them.

³⁵ The personal details of the victims are based on information obtained from the above sources. We have no database of our own containing such information. We apologize in advance if a victim's name was omitted or if the data given are inexact.

General description

Date: December 29, 2005

Event: A suicide bomber (one of two) blew himself up at an IDF roadblock south of Tulkarm.

Casualties: 1 IDF soldier dead and 3 wounded

Organization responsible: PIJ

Suicide bombers: 'Alaa Ibn al-Latif al-Sa'adi and Sahib Ibrahim al-'Ajami



The taxi that brought the suicide bomber to the Tulkarm roadblock (Photo courtesy of the Judea and Samaria Rescue Service, "Yesha News" Agency)

The attack

⊕ A suicide bomber (escorted by another terrorist) detonated an explosive device at an IDF roadblock on the Shavei Shomron-Einav road (south of Tulkarm). The roadblock was set up after the IDF received information that suicide bombers were planning to carry out attacks in Israel. According to Reuters (December 29) the terrorist who detonated the explosives was '**Alaa Ibn al-Latif al-Sa'adi**, 22 years old, unmarried, who served on the Palestinian police force in Jenin. The other terrorist was **Sahib Ibrahim al-'Ajami**, 19, from the village of 'Atil in the Tulkarm district.

⊕ A taxi arrived at the roadblock carrying three Palestinians. The IDF commander in charge asked one of the Palestinians to open his coat. As he did, he detonated the explosive belt he was wearing, and in the resulting explosion, which was powerful

and contained nails and metal scraps, the commander was killed and three other soldiers were wounded, one of the seriously. The two other Palestinians in the taxi were also killed.

✦ Apparently the explosion at the roadblock prevented a suicide bombing attack planned for a supermarket in the city of Rosh Ha'ayin the Hanukkah holiday vacation. The attack seems to have been planned and carried out by the PIJ terrorist-operative infrastructure in Samaria, which claimed responsibility in a video sent to various news agencies (Agence France-Presse, December 30).

The victim



Lieutenant **Uri Binamo**,
21, from Nesher
Survived by his parents and
three sisters.

General description

Date: December 5, 2005

Event: A suicide bomber blew himself up at the entrance of the Hasharon mall in Netanya

Casualties: 2 killed and some 40 wounded

Organization responsible: The Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Suicide bomber: Lutfi Amin Abd al-Latif Abu Sa'ada

The attack

On December 5, at about 11:30 AM, a suicide bomber blew himself up near the entrance of the Hasharon mall in Netanya. As a result, four civilians were killed on the spot (the fifth died of his injuries in the hospital) and some 40 were injured. It was the second terrorist attack perpetrated at the Hasharon mall during the lull in the fighting and the third since the beginning of the violent confrontation.

Before the suicide bomber detonated the charge he was carrying, he had been identified as a suspect by passers-by as he was walking slowly towards the Hasharon mall. The suicide bomber, whose hair was painted in a bright color (to make it easier for him, perhaps, to blend in with the Jewish crowd), was wearing a dark coat and carrying a large bag on his shoulder. Some civilians notified nearby police officers and the mall's security guards, but they were still unable to prevent the suicide bomber from blowing himself up near the entrance to the mall.



The suicide bomber, as photographed before departing for the terrorist attack (Al-Jazeera Television, December 5)



The scene of the terrorist attack near the Hasharon mall in Netanya (Al-Jazeera, December 5)



Andrei, mourning the death of his mother, Alexandra Gramitzky (Reuters, photo: Gil Cohen)

The victims



Keinan Tsuami, 19,
from Petah Tikva.
Survived by parents and
two brothers.



Haim Amram, 26,
from Netanya.
Survived by a family.



Alexandra Garmitzky,
65, from Netanya.
Survived by a husband
and a son.



Daniel (Dani) Golani, 45,
from Nahariya. Survived
by a wife and two
daughters.



Elia Rosen, 39, from
Bat Hefer. Survived by a
husband and three
children.

General description

Date: October 26, 2005

Event: A suicide bomber blew himself up near a market in Hadera

Casualties: 6 dead and some 30 wounded

Organization responsible: The Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Suicide bombers: Hassan Ahmed Hassan Abu Zeid



The suicide bomber reading his will, as recorded before leaving for the terrorist attack (Al-Jazeera Television, October 27, 2005)

The attack

On Wednesday, October 26, at about 4:00 PM, a suicide bomber arrived at a junction in Hadera near a local market, and set off a charge weighing some 10 lbs. near a falafel stand. As a result of the explosion, 5 civilians were killed and over 30 were injured (five of them sustained serious injuries).

The suicide bomber was **Hassan Ahmed Hassan Abu Zeid**, 20, married, from the town of Qabatia (a town south of Jenin, known as a place from which suicide bombers have departed for their attacks). Abu Zeid had been released from the Israeli prison several weeks before perpetrating the suicide bombing attack. In a video tape that captured Abu Zeid before leaving for the attack, he stated that the attack was a revenge for the killing of Luai Sa'adi, head of the

Palestinian Islamic Jihad infrastructure in Samaria.³⁶ We believe that the suicide bombing attack in Hadera had been planned before the killing of Luai Sa'adi, and it is possible, in our assessment, that its execution was quickened following his killing.

During the second half of November 2005, within the context of the security forces' preventive activity in the West Bank, senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives were arrested who had been involved in planning and perpetrating the terrorist attack in Hadera and other attacks. Prominent among them was **Iyad Mahmoud Hussein Abu al-Roub**, head of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Jenin area (November 24), responsible, among other things, for perpetrating the terrorist attack in Hadera.



The scene of the terrorist attack near the Hadera market (photo: Yaron Brener, Ynet)

³⁶ Luai Sa'adi was killed by IDF forces on October 23, 2005. See Information Bulletin published by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center: "During an IDF operation in Tulkarm on October 23, Luai Sa'adi head of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist infrastructure in the Tulkarm district, was killed. Also killed was Majid al-Ashkar, a senior operative. The PIJ infrastructure was behind terrorist attacks during the lull, among them a suicide bombing attack in Netanya in July 2005 and the suicide bombing attack at the Stage Club in Tel Aviv in February 2005. The attacks were planned by the PIJ leadership in Damascus to sabotage the lull and place the organization in the forefront of terrorist acts against Israel" (October 26, 2005).